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I. INTRODUCTION

Legal history, like all history, is inevitably a speculative affair.
No one can be sure what the editors of Justinian's Digest might have
excised from long-lost works of classical Roman law; nor can one know
for certain what went through the minds of certain justices of the U.S.
Supreme Court in the mid-twentieth century when they formed and
reformed their views on Roosevelt's New Deal. Of course, scholars can
try to chip away at this uncertainty: great progress can be made
through educated guesses and learned theories. But certainty about the
past is reserved for those who lived in it.

*
Associate Professor, SMU Dedman School of Law. For their helpful comments and
criticism, I would like to thank Robert Sitkoff and the other participants in the 2014 Vanderbilt
Law Review Symposium on "The Role of Federal Law in Private Wealth Transfer," cosponsored by
the ACTEC Foundation. I am also grateful to Greg Ivy and the Underwood Law Library staff for
their assistance in locating some of the sources, and to Nathan Cortez and other SMU colleagues
who offered helpful feedback at an early-stage faculty research workshop.
1.
Steven J. Horowitz & Robert H. Sitkoff, UnconstitutionalPerpetual Trusts, 67 VAND. L.
REV. 1769 (2014).
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What is true for history in general is true for the history of state
constitutional prohibitions of perpetuities, and in particular for the
curious prohibition in the 1776 North Carolina Constitution and
Declaration of Rights. The North Carolina prohibition is particularly
important because it came first, and its language influenced later state
constitutions. 2 As Horowitz and Sitkoff demonstrate in their Article,
many good reasons can be offered for the provision. 3 It is nevertheless
a curious prohibition, because it is absent from the constitutions of the
twelve other original states. Why did this provision emerge only in
North Carolina, and not in Virginia, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, or
any of the other "free states" that together rose up against their colonial
masters?
This Comment will suggest a possible answer to that question.
Although the problems with perpetuities were well known to learned
inhabitants of all the newly independent American states, those
problems were particularly salient in North Carolina in 1776 due to
that colony's unique history as a former proprietary colony. King
Charles II created the original province of Carolina to reward eight men
who had offered vital assistance while he was in exile. 4 The decision by
the heir of one of these original Lords Proprietors not to sell his share
back to the British Crown gave rise to specific grievances in North
Carolina-grievances that did not exist in the other twelve former
colonies. 5 Moreover, North Carolina was unique in witnessing a violent
confrontation between the colonial authorities andbackcountry farmers
that stemmed, in part, from those grievances. 6

2.
For example, the Tennessee Constitution of 1796 drew heavily upon the North Carolina
example because the territory of Tennessee was previously part of North Carolina and thus subject
to the North Carolina Constitution. See LEWIS L. LASKA, THE TENNESSEE STATE CONSTITUTION 5

(2011). Of the fifty-nine delegates to the Texas Convention of 1836, ten were born in North
Carolina and nine were born in Tennessee. See LOUIS WILTZ KEMP, THE SIGNERS OF THE TEXAS

DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE xxii (1944). Thus, at least one-third of the framers of the 1836
Constitution of the Republic of Texas were likely to have been directly or indirectly familiar with
the language of the North Carolina provision. Decades later, Arkansas and Oklahoma adopted
constitutional language almost identical to that of Texas, their geographical neighbor. See ARK.
CONST. of 1874, art. II, § 19; OKLA. CONST. of 1907, art. II, § 32. See generally Horowitz & Sitkoff,
supra note 1 (explaining the historical evolution of state constitutional prohibitions of
perpetuities).
3.
See Horowitz & Sitkoff, supra note 1, at 1788-91. In the case of Brown Bros. Harriman
Trust Co. v. Benson, the North Carolina Court of Appeals upheld the current North Carolina
perpetual trust statute against a constitutional challenge. 688 S.E.2d 752, 757 (2010). However,
the Benson opinion is controversial, and the issue has not yet been decided by the North Carolina
Supreme Court. See Horowitz & Sitkoff, supra note 1, at 1810-14.
4.
See infra Section H.A.
5
See infra Section II.B.
6
See infra Section II.C.
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The peculiar case of the Earl Granville and assorted problems in
his Granville District shifted the problem of perpetuities from the
periphery to the center of North Carolina politics in the late eighteenth
century, and thus warranted an explicit mention of perpetuities in the
1776 North Carolina Constitution and Declaration of Rights. For the
framers of that document, the social ills caused by tying up land
indefinitely in the hands of the few were of paramount importance, and
had to be addressed to build a successful coalition for independence.
This Comment first discusses the political and social history of the
province of North Carolina, focusing in particular on the Lords
Proprietors and Earl Granville. The Comment then addresses how that
history likely impacted the 1776 Constitution and Declaration of
Rights, which created a conservative system of government despite
radical instructions from some backcountry counties, and finally offers
a few concluding thoughts about the aspirations of many North
Carolina patriots at the dawn of independence.
II. POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN COLONIAL NORTH CAROLINA

A. The Lords Proprietors
The legal entity now known as the State of North Carolina traces
its origins to the restoration of the monarchy following the English Civil
War. After returning to England as king in 1660, Charles II rewarded
his supporters with land, titles, and other benefits. Among those singled
out for particular favor were the Lords Proprietors, eight men to whom
Charles granted an immense tract of land in North America named
Carolina in his honor. 7 These men, most of whom had no knowledge of
America, included Edward Hyde, First Earl of Clarendon and Lord
Chancellor; George Monck, First Duke of Albemarle, a general who
switched to the royalist side at a crucial moment in the war; and Sir
George Carteret, a naval officer who sheltered exiled members of the
royal family at his home on the Isle of Jersey.8 Despite their tenuous or
nonexistent ties to the New World, the Lords Proprietors and their heirs
and successors attempted to rule their distant colony for almost seven
decades. 9

7.
8.
9.

WILLIAM S. POWELL, NORTH CAROLINA THROUGH FOUR CENTURIES 53

(1989).

Id. at 54-55.
Seven of the eight Lords Proprietors had no intention of ever visiting America. See
NOELEEN MCILVENNA, A VERY MUTINOUS PEOPLE: THE STRUGGLE FOR NORTH CAROLINA, 16601713, 12 (2009) ("[O]nly William Berkeley had any plans for spending time anywhere near his new
endowment, and he imagined that he could control it safely from Jamestown.").
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The early history of Carolina was marked by numerous
difficulties, including Indian wars, piracy, and border disputes with the
neighboring colony of Virginia. 10 Moreover, overzealous or incompetent
administration by the colonial governors fomented several uprisings
and rebellions." In 1729, ten years after the division of the original
colony into the separate provinces of South and North Carolina, the
owners of seven of the original eight proprietary shares were persuaded
to sell their interests back to the Crown. 12 All of the owners, including
the proprietor who declined to sell his share of the land, abandoned
their claims to a voice in the government of the colony. 13
The sole holdout was John, Lord Carteret, who would later
acquire the title Earl Granville, and who had inherited the share
originally granted to Sir George Carteret. 14 Granville's share, which
would come to be known as the Granville District, was allocated entirely
within the province of North Carolina, and the division was so favorable
to the earl that the governor complained in 1743 that Earl Granville
had not only half the province, but "much the better half."15 It was a
source of great consternation for the governor that the provincial
government would thenceforth be responsible for governing all of North
Carolina, but would receive quitrent revenue (i.e., land taxes) from only
the southern counties, with the revenue from the northern counties
being sent to Earl Granville instead. 16

B. The GranvilleDistrict
In keeping with the tradition of the Lords Proprietors, the Earl
Granville never visited his district, instead employing agents to manage
the land on his behalf.17 However, it would have been unwise to
replicate the failed experiment in proprietary governance from which
Granville's title ultimately derived. North America had no shortage of
unoccupied land, and Granville's district would have to compete against
10. Id. at 77-78, 122, 149-58.
11.
POWELL, supra note 7, at 60-84.
12. Id. at 86.
13.
Henry G. Connor, The Granuille Estate and North Carolina,62 U. PA. L. REV. 671, 673
(1914).
14. Thornton W. Mitchell, The GranuilleDistrict and Its Land Records, 70 N.C. HIST. REV.
103, 103-07 (1997).
15.
Letter from Gabriel Johnston, Governor of N.C., to the Lords of the Bd. of Trade (June 6,
1746), in 4 WILLIAM L. SAUNDERS, THE COLONIAL RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA, at 792-93 (1886);
Mitchell, supra note 14, at 105-07.
16. A. ROGER EKIRCH, "POOR CAROLINA": POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN COLONIAL NORTH
CAROLINA, 1729-1776, at 92-98 (1981).
17.
Mitchell, supra note 14, at 107.
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the southern counties of North Carolina-as well as South Carolina,
Virginia, and the other colonies-in order to attract settlers. Granville
therefore offered favorable terms to prospective settlers to lure them
away from other land offices. 18 Rather than grant leases, the Granville
District office offered settlers fee simple title at a reasonable price and
without onerous restrictions on cutting timber, fishing, hunting, and
other activities important to prospective settlers.19 Granville also
directed his land agents to show "[i]ndulgence" in the collection of
quitrents "when it shall appear that Poverty or some unfortunate
accident had disabled any Tennant from paying." 20
Granville's progressive approach was initially quite successful,
and settlers eagerly purchased more than two million acres in the
Granville District between 1751 and 1762.21 The success of the district,
however, depended on the competency, trustworthiness, and good
behavior of the local agents Granville selected to administer his land
office, and it did not take long for serious problems to emerge. 22 Francis
Corbin, appointed as Granville's agent in 1749, proved to be a
particularly incompetent and untrustworthy administrator. 2 3 Among
other misdeeds, Corbin and his subordinates exacted excessive fees
from the settlers, failed to promptly deal with complaints, and made
political enemies by granting land to which Granville lacked legitimate
title. 24 The last of these was particularly vexing to the settlers, for the
resulting uncertainty of title frustrated their primary purpose in
immigrating to the frontier and limited their attachment to the area. 25
The angry backcountry settlers initially sought the assistance of
the North Carolina General Assembly, but their complaints against
Corbin were not redressed until after the so-called Enfield Riot of 1759,
when a group of men kidnapped Corbin from his house and took him to
18. EKIRCH, supra note 16, at 129.
19. Id. at 128-30.
20. Id. at 130 (quoting Granville's instructions to his agents).
21. Id.
22.
Mitchell, supra note 14, at 111.
23. Although some of the misdeeds in the Granville office were the fault of Corbin's
subordinates, the responsibility for the abuses that occurred ultimately lies with Corbin for failing
properly to execute the office assigned to him. George Stevenson, Corbin,Francis,in 1 DICTIONARY
OF NORTH CAROLINA BIOGRAPHY 431, 432 (William S. Powell ed., 1979).

24. See, e.g., EKIRCH, supra note 16, at 135; Stevenson, supra note 23, at 432; Mitchell, supra
note 14, at 111-14. The inability of a property owner to monitor his agent is a classic example of
an agency costs problem. See, e.g., Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89
CORNELL L. REV. 621, 636-37 (2004).
25.
See Daniel Fredrick Blower, The Orange County and Mecklenburg County Instructions:
The Development of Political Individualism in Backcountry North Carolina, 1740-1776, at 248
(1984) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan) (on file with University Microfilms
International).
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the town of Enfield. There, Corbin promised under duress to fire various
deputies and was compelled to give bond to guarantee a court
appearance. 26 Although Granville dismissed and replaced Corbin soon
after the riot, problems continued, and the situation became even worse
when Granville died in 1763 and the Granville District land office shut
down completely, leaving settlers unable to obtain land. 2 7

C. Violence and Revolution
North Carolina was a relatively poor colony, and the
undeveloped state of its economy made it particularly vulnerable to civil
unrest. 2 8 In contrast to their counterparts in South Carolina, the
planter class in North Carolina was relatively weak and unrefined, and
poorer white farmers were less deferential to the plantation elite, with
resentment always bubbling under the surface. 29 In the frontier
counties of Orange and Rowan, the closing of the Granville land office
in 1763 fed the flames of an increasingly unstable political situation. 30
The late 1760s witnessed the rise of the Regulators, which began as a
peaceful movement opposed to unfair taxation, corruption, and abuse of
power, but quickly turned toward open and violent disregard of civil
authority.31 Regulators engaged in armed confrontations with
provincial officials from 1768 to 1771, when they were ultimately
subdued by Governor Tryon and the provincial militia at the Battle of
Alamance. 32
The Battle of Alamance pitted Governor Tryon and a force of
eleven hundred men, mostly from the eastern counties and including
many "gentlemen volunteers" who would later achieve prominence as
patriots in the Revolution, against a force of approximately two
thousand Regulators. 33 In the battle, the Regulators had some initial
success using "Indian style" tactics, such as firing from behind rocks

26. See EKIRCH, supra note 16, at 141; Mitchell, supra note 14, at 114; Blower, supra note
25, at 249-51.
27.
See Mitchell, supra note 14, at 114-17.
28. See EKIRCH, supranote 16, at 219.
29. See MCILVENNA, supra note 9, at 162 (2009) (noting that "no one displayed Charleston's
powdered wigs or porcelain," and "Eastern planters could not command the outward signs of
deference from less wealthy white farmers").
30. See EKIRCH, supranote 16, at 177-78; Mitchell, supra note 14, at 117.
31. See BILL CECIL-FRONSMAN, COMMON WHITES: CLASS AND CULTURE IN ANTEBELLUM
NORTH CAROLINA 56 (1992).
32.
See RICHARD R. BEEMAN, THE VARIETIES OF POLITICAL EXPERIENCE IN EIGHTEENTHCENTURY AMERICA 169-77 (2004).
33.

See MARJOLEINE KARS, BREAKING LOOSE TOGETHER: THE REGULATOR REBELLION IN

PRE-REVOLUTIONARY NORTH CAROLINA 197-99 (2002).
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and trees, but they lacked organization and were short on
ammunition. 34 The governor's forces prevailed, but at a cost of nine
dead and sixty-one wounded militiamen, along with nine dead and an
uncertain number of wounded Regulators. 35 Although the Regulators
were defeated, the violent dispute between the backcountry settlers and
the eastern provincial elite cast a shadow over North Carolina that
made its political landscape unique among the colonies at the dawn of
independence. 36 In no other colony prior to the Revolution did colonists
wage war against other colonists in the way they did in North
Carolina. 37
In October 1776, less than six years after the Battle of Alamance,
the counties of North Carolina elected delegates to the Fifth Provincial
Congress, which was to serve as a constitutional convention for the
newly independent government of North Carolina. 38 Two of the
backcountry counties, Mecklenburg and Orange, gave written
instructions to their delegates that set forth an explicitly democratic
theory of governance. 39 The delegates from Mecklenburg were
instructed that "[p]olitical power is of two kinds, one principal and
superior, the other derived and inferior," and that "[t]he principal
supreme power is possessed by the people at large, the derived and
inferior power by the servants which they employ." 40 The instructions
given to the delegates from Orange County contain almost identical
language. 4 1 The Mecklenburg instructions further commanded the
delegates to "oppose everything that leads to aristocracy or power in the
hands of the rich and chief men exercised to the oppression of the poor,"
and urge the enactment of legislation under the new constitution "to
34.

Id. at 201.

35.

See HUGH T. LEFLER & WILLIAM S. POWELL, COLONIAL NORTH CAROLINA: A HISTORY 238

(1973).
36. See POWELL, supra note 7, at 159; see also BEEMAN, supra note 32, at 176:
But whatever confusion there may be about the underlying patterns of allegiance in the
Carolina backcountry, there is no doubt that the Revolution in that region really was
an "uncivil war," one which turned neighbor against neighbor, community against
community, and significant regions of the Carolina backcountry against the patriot and
provincial governments to the east.
37. See EKIRCH, supranote 16, at xviii-xix.
38. See Robert L. Ganyard, Radicals and Conservatives in Revolutionary North Carolina:A
Point at Issue, The October Election, 1776, 24 WM. & MARY Q. 568, 568 (1967).
39. Blower, supra note 25, at 97.
40. Instructions to the Delegates from Mecklenburg to the Provincial Congress, in 10 THE
COLONIAL RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 15, at 870b.

41. See Instructions to the Delegates from Orange in the Halifax
COLONIAL RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 15, at 870f ("Political
one principal and supreme the other derived and inferior. . . . The principal
possessed only by the people at large, the derived and inferior power
employ.").

Congress, in 10 THE
power is of two kinds,
and supreme power is
by the servants they
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secure men from being disturbed by old and foreign claims against their
landed possessions." 4 2
Although the instructions from Mecklenburg and Orange were
most likely drafted by educated men, they took inspiration from the
history of the backcountry counties and the specific problems that the
settlers encountered there. 43 Insecurity in land titles was a critical and
widespread problem in colonial North Carolina that "directly
justification
in
government's
fundamental
undermined
the
contemporary political thought as well as in purely practical terms."4 4
The settlers' resort to vigilante tactics against Lord Granville's agent in
1759 reflected a fundamental breakdown of the compact between the
government and its citizens.4 5 Given that background, the principle
stated in the Mecklenburg and Orange declarations regarding the
supreme power of the people was no mere platitude.
III. PERPETUITIES AND THE NORTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTION OF 1776
Despite the democratic mandate given to the delegates from
Orange and Mecklenburg, the constitution produced by the Fifth
Provincial Congress "was an essentially conservative document."4 6
Although the first clause of the Declaration of Rights provided that "all
political power is vested in and derived from the people only,"4 7 the
constitution limited voting rights to freemen who possessed varying
amounts of land, depending on the importance of the office in question,
and imposed even more burdensome property qualifications on men
seeking election to office. 4 8 The governor and various other key
executive officials were elected by the General Assembly, not directly
by the people, and the same was true of all the judges. 9 The nature of
the constitution suggests that the balance of power at the Fifth
Provincial Congress was held by men of conservative views, not those
who subscribed to the democratic theories communicated to the
Mecklenburg and Orange delegates. 50

42.
Instructions to the Delegates from Mecklenburg, in 10 THE COLONIAL RECORDS OF
NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 15, at 870b, 870f.
43.
See Blower, supra note 25 at 536-37.
44. See id. at 558.
45. See id. at 559-60.
46. Ganyard, supra note 8, at 570.
47. N.C. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, § 1.
48.

See JOHN V. ORTH & PAUL MARTIN NEWBY, THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE CONSTITUTION

6 (2d ed. 2013) (citing N.C. CONST. of 1776 §§ 5-8, 15).
49. See id. (citing N.C. CONST. of 1776 §§ 13, 15-16, 22, 24).
50. See Ganyard,supra note 38, at 582.
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If the overall system of government established by the North
Carolina Constitution of 1776 was essentially conservative, the specific
provision regarding perpetuities and monopolies in Clause 23 of the
Declaration of Rights-that "perpetuities and monopolies are contrary
to the genius of a free State, and ought not to be allowed"-seems more
in line with the democratic theory of the Mecklenburg and Orange
instructions. 5 1 The language of Clause 23 is quite similar to Section 39
of the Declaration of Rights of the Maryland Constitution of 1776, which
provides that "monopolies are odious, contrary to the spirit of a free
government, and the principles of commerce; and ought not to be
suffered." 52 The Maryland Declaration of Rights was first circulated on
August 27 and ratified on November 3, 1776, and thus predated the
North Carolina Declaration of Rights, the drafting committee for which
was not appointed until November 13 of the same year. 53 While scholars
have offered differing explanations for the Maryland prohibition of
monopolies, it echoes the position of the English common law at that
time and reflects the consensus view among American supporters of
independence that artificial barriers to equality of opportunity should
be removed.54
North Carolina was not the first state to specifically mention
perpetuities in its declaration of rights. Section 37 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution of 1776 provided that "[t]he future legislature of this state
shall regulate intails in such a manner as to prevent perpetuities." 5 5
The Pennsylvania constitution also predated that of North Carolina,
having been ratified on September 28, 1776.56 This section of the
Pennsylvania Constitution was adopted verbatim as Section 43 of the
North Carolina Constitution of 1776.57 The innovation of the North
Carolina Constitution was to add perpetuities to the prohibition of
monopolies in the Maryland Declaration of Rights as being "contrary to

§ 23.
§ 39.

51.
52.

N.C. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights,
MD. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights,

53.

See 10 THE COLONIAL RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 15, at 916-18; DAN

FRIEDMAN, THE MARYLAND STATE CONSTITUTION 5 (2011).
54. Compare FRIEDMAN, supra note 53, at 75 n.258 (2011) (concluding that the historical
disdain for monopolies in the English common law is the most plausible explanation for the
provision), with GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 72
(1993 ed.) (associating early republican prohibitions on monopolies such as the Maryland provision
with a broader campaign against impediments to equality of opportunity).
55.
PA. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, § 37.
56.
See MURRAY DRY, CIVIL PEACE AND THE QUEST FOR TRUTH: THE FIRST AMENDMENT
FREEDOMS IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 34 (2004).

57.

N.C. CONST. of 1776,

§ 43.
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the spirit of a free State" (or "free government"). 5 8 North Carolina was
the only state to claim explicitly in its 1776 Constitution that
perpetuities were an obstacle to freedom.5 9
How, then, can the language of Clause 23 of the North Carolina
1776 Declaration of Rights be explained? Less than six years had passed
since the colonial government took the battlefield against a restless
band of vigilantes in the backcountry, whose grievances included their
inability to obtain land due to the closing of the Granville District land
office, as well as the incompetent or malicious administration of some
of Earl Granville's agents. 0 In a letter written in 1771, Josiah Martin,
the last royal governor of North Carolina, had attributed the political
disorder in the province to "[t]he proprietary right of the Earl Granville"
since, in the absence of a land agent, the settlers could not "establish
freeholds," and therefore "set themselves down where they please[d]"
and "refuse[d] to pay Taxes which ha[d] been and still [were] a source
of perpetual discord and uneasiness." 6 1 This problem would have been
a high priority not only for the backcountry delegates at the Fifth
Provincial Congress, but also for the representatives of the eastern elite
who needed the support of backcountry settlers in the cause of
independence. 62
Even if Earl Granville's proprietary right could not be called a
perpetuity in the technical sense, since the heirs of the other Lords
Proprietors were able to sell their shares back to the Crown, it had
caused some of the same evils attributed to perpetuities by Blackstone,
who explained in his Commentaries that "the law abhors [perpetuities]
because by perpetuities .

.

. estates are made incapable of answering

those ends of social commerce, and providing for the sudden
contingencies of private life, for which property was first established." 63
Another rationale for the law's abhorrence of perpetuities, offered by
Lord Nottingham in the Duke of Norfolk's Case, is that the associated
remainders "pretend to such a Stability in human affairs, as the Nature
of them admits not of."64 This might equally be said of the proprietary
interest of Earl Granville in distant North Carolina, an interest that

58.
Rights,
59.
60.
61.

MD. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights,

§ 39;

N.C. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of

§ 23.
Horowitz & Sitkoff, supra note 1, at 1788-90.
See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
Letter from Josiah Martin, Governor of N.C., to the Earl of Hillsborough (Nov. 10, 1771),

in 9 THE COLONIAL RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 15, at 48-49.

62. See generally BEEMAN, supra note 32, at 176 (explaining the complex politics of the
Revolution in North and South Carolina).
63.

2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES at *174.

64.

(1682) 22 Eng. Rep. 931, 949 (ch); 3 Chan. Cas. 1, 30.
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originated as a reward for a supporter of the king and served a useful
purpose in the early settlement of the province, but eventually became
a clog on commerce and a source of civil unrest. In other words, while
the policy reasons that justified a ban on perpetuities were known to all
the colonists, those reasons were more salient for the constitutional
delegates from North Carolina in 1776 because of their recent
experience of instability caused by the hereditary title of an absentee
English lord.
IV. CONCLUSION
If the specific ban against perpetuities in the North Carolina
Constitution of 1776 was rooted in political and social ills unique to that
colony prior to independence, what ramifications might that have for
the interpretation of the provision today? Perhaps none. The inclusion
of a separate clause, copied from the Pennsylvania Constitution,
providing that the legislature "shall regulate entails, in such a manner
as to prevent perpetuities" shows that the framers of the North Carolina
Constitution of 1776 were hostile to perpetuities as conventionally
defined; they were not simply motivated by the unique circumstances
surrounding the Granville District.6 5 On the other hand, when the
North Carolina legislature in 1784 spoke out against the ills associated
with entails as proving to be "in manifold instances the source of great
contention and injustice," 66 it is not too much of a stretch to imagine
that the framers were thinking about the grievances of backcountry
farmers and the Battle of Alamance.
As the elite of North Carolina well knew, the violence in their
province on the eve of independence was to some extent the byproduct
of a political structure that extracted great wealth for the private
benefit of Earl Granville and the Lords Proprietors before him.
Independence eliminated those specific problems, but the leaders did
not want a homegrown aristocracy to cause similar problems in the
future by taking advantage of ancient tools available in the English
common law. 67 The provisions relating to entails and perpetuities in the
65. See N.C. CONST. of 1776, § 43. The revolutionary government quickly seized the papers
of the Granville land office in 1777, and the Granville District ceased to exist for all practical
purposes, although lawsuits brought on behalf of the Granville heirs after independence dragged
on for more than a century afterward. See Mitchell, supranote 14, at 122-26 (discussing the effects
of the American Revolution on the Granville District and its records).
66. N.C. Act of 1784, ch. 22, § 5, reprintedin 24 STATE RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 574
(W. Clark ed., 1905).
67. John Orth has argued that the 1784 legislation extended only to possessory estates in
fee tail, not to future interests. See John V. Orth, Does the Fee Tail Exist in North Carolina?, 23
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 767, 792-95 (1988).
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1776 Constitution and Declaration of Rights signaled that the relics of
English feudalism had no place in the new American state.
Paul Newby and John Orth have suggested that the word
"genius" in the 1776 North Carolina Declaration of Rights means
"special character." 68 What did the representatives at the Fifth
Provincial Congress and other North Carolina republicans consider to
be the distinctive character of a free state? Many of those who fought to
free themselves from British colonial rule were driven, at least in part,
by a desire to strike out against familial influence, patronage,
hierarchy, and the other trappings of a hereditary aristocracy. 69 Of
course, the planter class of the southern states was not opposed to
privilege: to point out the obvious, their power depended on slavery, and
their descendants would eventually fight and die in a doomed attempt
to preserve that institution. In order to win support from the
backcountry settlers for the cause of independence, however, the
planters promised a future in which the sons and grandsons of all
patriots could eventually rise to high office regardless of their family
origins. It may be impossible to achieve equality of condition, but a
republic can at least strive to ensure equality of opportunity.70 Perhaps
that was what the patriots of North Carolina meant by the "genius of a
free state," and what persists today, with some modifications, as the
American dream.
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70. On the distinction between equality of condition and equality of opportunity in
republican thought, see WOOD, supra note 54, at 70-72.

